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Vol 5: Issue No.Q1 : Jan-Mar, 2005
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Hony. Editor
Dr. Bindi Mehta
Professor & Chairperson (Research & Publications)
Narsee Monjee Institute of Management Studies
(Deemed University)




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THE ROLE OF NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THEIR CAPACITY BUILDING

A Perspective from Pakistan

Shahnawaz Mahmood
(Economist, based in Islamabad, Pakistan)
Recent corporate scandals have exposed various structural weaknesses. Companies across the world are facing challenges of transparency and accountability. In this scenario, the role of non-executive directors gains significant importance. In Pakistan, the Code of Corporate Governance (“the Code”) has been developed. The Code lays emphasis on the role of non-executive directors through the Board of Directors and Audit Committee. However, like other developing countries, there is shortage of trained non-executive directors. In this regard, the developing countries need to take steps to build capacity of non-executive directors. This paper specifically investigates the role of non-executive directors and what future steps need to be taken in order to build their capacity.
Corporate Governance

There is no universally accepted definition of corporate governance. It is a basically a set of relationships between a company's board, management, its shareholders and the society within an institutional framework. These relationships evolve into the corporate governance framework, which is “the system by which companies are directed and controlled”. It is essential to recognize that every company operates within a 'unique' jurisdiction of its stakeholders including investors, creditors, employees, managers, and regulators. Good corporate governance seeks to create an institutional framework that encourages all participants to contribute towards better corporate performance aligned with good governance practices.

Good governance leads to development of a framework that provides adequate protection to the interests of stakeholders and reinforces the fiduciary responsibilities of those vested with the authority to act on behalf of the stakeholders.

Code of Corporate Governance of Pakistan

The need for good corporate governance in Pakistan is indisputable. During the last few years, the economy has been volatile characterized by low investor confidence, tough global competition and lack of foreign investment. The major cause is the lack of transparency and accountability in the corporate sector. Majority of the companies are closely held and managed without taking into account the interests of minority shareholders. Minority shareholders are exploited, adequate disclosures are missing and corporate information is not accessible to all.

The Security and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SEC), which was established in 1999, has taken various regulatory measures to revive investors’ confidence. The SEC has been particularly interested to encourage corporate governance in the country in order to ensure transparency and accountability in the corporate sector and safeguard the interests of all stakeholders. In March 2002, the first Code of Corporate Governance for Pakistan was finalized and issued by the SEC. It was subsequently incorporated in the listing regulations of the three stock exchanges (Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad) and is now applicable to all public listed companies (including modarabas and mutual funds).

The Code primarily aims to establish a system whereby a company is directed and controlled by its directors in compliance with the best practices so as to safeguard the interests of diversified stakeholders. It proposes to restructure the composition of the Board of Directors in order to introduce broad-based representation by minority shareholders and by executive and non-executive directors. The Code emphasizes openness and transparency in corporate affairs and the decision-making process and requires directors to discharge their fiduciary duties.

Non-executive Directors and the Code

The Code of Corporate Governance emphasizes the role of Non-executive directors in the Board of Directors and Audit Committee.

a) Board of Directors

According to the Code, all listed companies shall encourage effective representation of independent non-executive directors, including those representing minority interests, on their Boards of Directors. The Board of Directors of each listed company includes at least one independent director representing institutional equity interest of a banking company, Development Financial Institution, Non-Banking Financial Institution (including a leasing company or investment bank), mutual fund or insurance company.

Executive directors, i.e. working or whole time directors are not more than 75% of the elected directors including the Chief Executive. Provided further that nothing contained in this clause shall apply to banking companies, which are required by Prudential Regulation No.9 for Banks to have not more than 25% of the directors as paid executives of the banks. The Chairman of a listed company shall preferably be elected from among the non-executive directors of the listed company. The Board of Directors shall clearly define the respective roles and responsibilities of the Chairman and Chief Executive. The Chairman of a listed company, if present, shall preside over meetings of the Board of Directors. The Board of Directors of a listed company shall meet at least once in every quarter of the financial year. The directors of listed companies shall exercise their powers and carry out their fiduciary duties with a sense of objective judgment and independence in the best interests of the listed company.

b) Audit Committee

According to the Code, the Board of Directors of every listed company shall establish an Audit Committee, which shall comprise not less than three members, including the chairman. Majority of the members of the Committee shall be from among the non-executive directors of the listed company and the chairman of the Audit Committee shall preferably be a non-executive director. The Audit Committee of a listed company shall meet at least once every quarter of the financial year. These meetings shall be held prior to the approval of interim results of the listed company by its Board of Directors and before and after completion of external audit. The CFO, the head of internal audit and a representative of the external auditors shall attend meetings of the Audit Committee at which issues relating to accounts and audit are discussed. The audit committee will also review quarterly, half-yearly and annual financial statements of the listed company, prior to their approval by the Board of Directors. Monitoring compliance with the best practices of corporate governance and identification of significant violations is also responsibility of this committee.

The Audit Committee shall, among other things, be responsible for recommending to the Board of Directors the appointment of external auditors by the listed company’s shareholders and shall consider any questions of resignation or removal of external auditors, audit fees and provision by external auditors of any service to the listed company in addition to audit of its financial statements. The terms of reference of the Audit Committee shall also include ascertaining that the internal control system including financial and operational controls, accounting system and reporting structure are adequate and effective.

Board of directors consists of executive and non-executive directors. Executive directors are full-time employees of the company. They are responsible for managing the affairs of the company. However, it can be difficult for executive directors to remain independent and ensure necessary accountability. Non-executive directors on the other hand bring credibility to the Board of directors.

The attributes of a non-executive director are independence of mind, integrity and the courage to question the executive members. Non-executive directors can add value to the Boards of companies of all sizes by requiring transparency in the operations of a company, maintaining independent checks and balances on the authority of executive directors and CEO, bringing in specific skills and expertise, providing strategic vision, participating in the Audit Committee, chairing the Board of directors and carrying out the responsibilities according to the Code. In order to objectively monitor the activities of senior management, non-executive directors must be independent. This implies that non-executive directors are not connected with the company or its promoters or directors on the basis of family relationship and do not have any other relationship, whether pecuniary or otherwise, with the company or its directors or related parties. To be able to effectively monitor, it is imperative that non-executive directors be given significant representation on the Board.

The SEC took various steps to implement the code. These included steps to broaden understanding of stakeholders on corporate governance issues through a variety of means ranging from development of focused publications to arranging group training of directors and management of listed companies. It is also intended that an Institute of Corporate Governance will be set up in Pakistan to promote compliance with good governance practices.

Even though the Code of Corporate Governance has been introduced in Pakistan, many challenges lie ahead. These include the shortage of trained directors to sit on the boards. Moreover, there are a number of issues relating to non-executive directors. The non-executive directors are not full time employees and therefore do not devote their whole working-time to a company which means that they may be unable to fully discharge their statutory and fiduciary duties. They usually lack the necessary expertise to fully understand the business of the company. Sometimes, lack of awareness of their fiduciary duties means that they are not able to discharge their responsibilities. Lastly, companies do not provide non-executive directors with possess sufficient information to effectively participate in the decision-making process.

Other challenges include enforcement of the Code and higher cost of compliance with the Code for small sized companies.

Future Steps

After developing a Code for Corporate governance, the next obvious step is to start the process of capacity building of all stakeholders. In this regard, training workshops should first be organized for directors (both executive and non-executive) and senior management of the listed companies who could also be potential directors. The developing countries such as Pakistan may benefit from a dedicated Institute of Corporate Governance with Governmental initiative, as in the case of several other countries. Such an institute could provide director training and also serve as a forum for discussion and self-development thus playing a vital role in capacity building, particularly of non-executive directors. However, with the passage of time, an organization like the Institute of Directors should be established by the private and voluntary sectors with the primary objective of capacity building of the directors. Companies should also provide adequate training opportunities to their directors to familiarize them with their statutory and fiduciary duties. Retiring executive directors may also be provided training to familiarize them with the role of non-executive directors.

Institutional shareholder activism can also be promoted by nominee directors (i.e. non-executive directors nominated by financial institutions). The Code of Corporate Governance highlights the role of nominee directors as independent non-executive directors, probably reckoning the critical and significant presence of institutional finance in our economy. These nominee directors need to adopt a more proactive role as the Code of Corporate Governance lays emphasis on the role of non-executive directors. They would need corporate governance training, in house or institutional, with particular emphasis on managing conflicts of interests and discharging fiduciary roles effectively.

(Published in IJTD Special Issue on Corporate Governance)

 

 
     
     
 

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE & PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF DIRECTORS

by
Prof.N. Balasubramanian

 
 

It is now widely recognized that being on the boards of corporations is no longer just a prestigious avocation but one that is proving very demanding and often increasingly onerous. One side of the coin is the status associated with being a director, and the associated perquisites that position endows on the incumbent; the flip side is the fiduciary and legal responsibilities that this position entails, together with the mounting pressures from investors and their advocacies for demonstrable accountability.
In this paper, we review the emerging requirements and best practices for being a good and conscientious company director, the imperatives for professional and academic guidance in enhancing their preparedness and performance, suggest some possible structures in terms of content, coverage and delivery of such programmes, and discuss the need for an Institutional framework for Director Guidance and, perhaps, even certification. In the course of this review, we also allude to some national and international experiments and developments in this field of director training.


 
 

I. Emerging Role & Responsibilities of Company Directors

Modern tenets of good corporate governance enjoin several specific responsibilities on members of company boards. Some of these are ordained by law, while many more are perceived as proper and necessary in the discharge of the fiduciary responsibilities of the directors.

Role, Responsibility and Accountability

Despite the increasing focus on board accountability and contribution, there is little doubt on the board’s role to direct the affairs of the company and its responsibility to exercise oversight control such that the wealth and wealth-creating assets of the company are protected. Arguably the most extensive and far-reaching delineation of board responsibilities is to be found in the Canadian guidelines , which identify five specific components of the board's stewardship responsibilities as follows:

• adoption of a strategic planning process, including monitoring of performance,
• management of risk
• recruitment, retention, rewarding and replacement of senior management, the chief executive,
• effective and transparent communication, and
• ensuring integrity of corporate internal control and management information systems.

To these must be added the responsibility of ensuring that the business of the organization is carried out within a laid down value framework that covers business integrity and ethics, social responsiveness and corporate citizenship.

None of this of course implies that the board itself has to take hands-on responsibility in preparing strategic plans or implementing appropriate internal controls and so on, which are all the function of the chief executive and his or her operating team. But clearly, it is the responsibility of the board to see that appropriate systems and processes are in place that would ensure, facilitate, encourage, and monitor proper discharge of these responsibilities. This would of course include appropriate feedback and review mechanisms to provide reasonable assurance that laid down systems were in fact being followed and that any deviant behaviour was flagged for attention and correction.

The Cadbury Report (1992) described the board responsibility in more succinct phraseology, to include setting the company's strategic aims, providing the leadership to put them into effect, supervising the management of the business, and reporting to shareholders on their stewardship. It is to the credit of the Cadbury Committee, successive reviewing committees have virtually retained the basic edifice postulated, and built upon it to recognize both practical convenience and changing business dynamics. Most, if not virtually all of these recommendations are now incorporated in the combined code applicable to companies listed on the London Stock Exchange.

Several other countries have followed suit, in this renaissance of corporate governance standards in the last decade of the 20th century and flowing into the 21st. In 1999, the OECD Principles on Corporate Governance were published; these were revised and reissued in 2004. In the same year, the Commonwealth Association for Corporate Governance articulated the role and responsibilities of the board in greater detail.

Any review, however brief, of international developments in the area of board and director roles and responsibilities, would not be complete without reference to the events and regulatory responses in the United States, in the closing years of the last millennium and spilling over to the beginning years of the 21st Century close on the heels of corporate misdemeanours and disasters in the country, exemplified by the demise of Enron and the reputed audit firm, Arthur Anderson, governance requirements were considerably tightened by the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, by major strengthening of independence criteria through the New York Stock Exchange listing requirement, and by the constitution of the watchdog entity, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. All these measures were aimed at enhancing corporate board, and executive accountability to shareholders and investors.

In India, the SEBI (Kumar Mangalam Birla) Report on Corporate Governance (KMB) describes this role as providing leadership and strategic guidance, objective and independent judgement, and control over the company in the discharge of its accountability to the shareholders. Direction, control, and accountability as the three prongs of board responsibility have been described in the following manner:

“The board directs the company, by formulating and reviewing company’s policies, strategies, major plans of action, risk policy, annual budgets and business plans, setting performance objectives, monitoring implementation and corporate performance, and overseeing major capital expenditures, acquisitions and divestitures, change in financial control and compliance with applicable laws, taking into account the interests of stakeholders. It controls the company and its management by laying down the code of conduct, overseeing the process of disclosure and communications, ensuring that appropriate systems for financial control and reporting and monitoring risk are in place, evaluating the performance of management, chief executive, executive directors and providing checks and balances to reduce potential conflict between the specific interests of management and the wider interests of the company and shareholders including misuse of corporate assets and abuse in related party transactions. It is accountable to the shareholders for creating, protecting and enhancing wealth and resources for the company, and reporting to them on the performance in a timely and transparent manner. However, it is not involved in day-to-day management of the company, which is the responsibility of the management.”

The distinction between direction (which is the responsibility of the board) and management (which is the responsibility of executive management including the managing director and other directors in their role as executives) is often not as clearly perceived as it ought to be. It was the 1994 Canadian report that first drew specific attention to this important distinction and recommended that "governing corporate statutes be revised to eliminate any possible interpretation of the directors' responsibility as being to manage the business day-to-day and to describe the responsibility as being to supervise the management of the business". While this position is in fact recognized in Indian law, though in a contextually different situation, where the Managing Director (meaning the Chief Executive) is defined as being entrusted with "substantial powers of management" and the exercise of such powers being "subject to the superintendence, control and direction of its Board of Directors" [emphasis supplied], there are other confusing and misleading references such as for example, directors' remuneration being broadly covered under managerial remuneration, and several maters dealing with the Board and the directors being grouped under a broad chapter heading titled Management and Administration. There is clearly a need to bring this important distinction into stronger focus and possibly group provisions relating to governance, board, directors etc in a separate chapter preceding those dealing with management and operations.

The KMB Report (2000) has done well to highlight these distinctions by defining the board's responsibilities as relating to direction, control and accountability, and those of the executive or management as relating to maximization of shareholder value without detriment to other stakeholder interests. A detailed listing of management functions in the Report also helps to further clarify the differing roles of the board and directors on the one hand, and the executive management on the other.

While accountability to the shareholders and creation of wealth for them are seen as central to the corporate governance debate, there is no denying the board's accountability to the company's stakeholders as well. Prominent among the advocacy of stakeholder rights is the 1995 work of Margaret Blair in which she rejects the traditional residual claimants theory supporting shareholder primacy, and postulates the rights of employees in particular where their firm-specific investments may be more important in the wealth creation process than the financial resources provided by the shareholders. Many other economists have from time to time espoused the cause of other stakeholders like customers, community, vendors, etc. The basic objective of good governance in this view, would be to legally and ethically optimize a sustainable return on the investment and ensuring its fair and equitable distribution among all legitimate stakeholders.

Modern governance codes tend to tread a cautious middle path. While shareholder wealth creation is still the focus, stakeholder interests also need to be protected. The OECD document on corporate governance authored by Mr. Ira Millstein and five others including Sir Adrian Cadbury, observes that while acknowledging the primary objective of corporations in market economies as generating economic profit so as to enhance shareholder value in the long term, corporate governance must simultaneously fulfill broader economic, social and other national objectives. The SEBI Kumar Mangalam Birla Report (2000) postulates that the primary objective of corporate governance is the enhancement of shareholder value, keeping in view the interests of other stakeholders.

The board's role then is to steer a clear course in driving shareholder wealth creation and protection. In pursuing this goal, relationships with stakeholders need to be managed such that their interests are also taken care of. This is indeed a complex scenario, particularly when such competing interests are unlikely to be goal-congruent, with boards often being seen as pursuing a policy of hunting with the hounds and running with the hares. In cases where shareholders' interests are threatened, boards will have to move in to protect them to the extent they can.

II. Professional & Academic Guidance

Given the brief overview of the emerging requirements and expectations of corporate directors, it is important to highlight the imperatives of equipping both the incumbent and prospective directors with an adequate appreciation of the principles and practices in this field. As can be readily appreciated, under the overarching umbrella label of corporate governance are included several dimensions of responsibilities such as the legal dimension, the financial dimension, the behavioural and human resources dimension, the control dimension, the communications dimension, the value dimension, and so on. Board members arrive at their destination through a variety of routes and expertise: the executive and functional whole time directors including the managing directors and executive chairmen come up through their functional and professional specializations and leadership skills; non-executive directors (including the independent directors) are inducted on to company boards for their wisdom, expertise and experience, and often also for their successful track record of performance. In either case, directors could be handpicked by the controlling groups of owners or managers, or nominated by other stakeholders such as financial institutions, the government, employee associations, and so on. While their entry to the boardroom may be fully justified on the basis of their personal excellence in their chosen fields of expertise, most of them are in varying degrees quite unprepared for their new responsibilities. Often, board appointments are perceived as just rewards of good work done, and it is not uncommon to view such appointments as promotions.

A totally different and overwhelming dimension of responsibility, rarely fully understood or appreciated, awaits the newly appointed director. Elevation to the board, an expression often used, is perhaps a most appropriate term for this event, because it does involve a paradigm shift in the individual’s attitude and approach to issues that come for discussion and decision.

The need therefore for some academic and professional inputs to cope with these new realities cannot be gainsaid. It is more in the nature of a basic change in orientation that is called for: not so much in terms of further business or functional inputs (important as they are) but more in terms of a different orientation necessary for evaluating board decisions from the perspective of the directors’ fiduciary and stewardship obligations to numerous clientele groups both inside and outside the domain of the company’s business operations. This is the reason why the directors’ programme on corporate governance periodically offered at the Indian Institute of Management Bangalore Centre for Corporate Governance and Citizenship is titled an Orientation Programme rather than simply as a training programme. Because of its scope extending beyond just executive competencies, this Orientation Programme is not part of the Institute’s celebrated Executive Education Programmes Division, but choreographed by the specialist Centre for Corporate Governance and Citizenship.

Another important dimension of such programmes is the nature of information flows: it is not just limited to lectures by academics alone but a range of inputs from other practitioners in the field are dovetailed into the programme content and delivery. Equally, participants learn from each other as well, perhaps more so than only from the speakers. This is enabled by rigorous screening of prospective participants for their record of board interaction and exposure, so that the eventual group is crafted as a cohesive and compatible set of participants, who literally have been there, have done it and so interact from personal experience and are able to relate inputs they receive to the situations they are familiar with or likely to be involved in. The selection, therefore, both of faculty and participants in such programmes is of great importance and may spell the difference between success and failure of the events themselves.

Course content is the next major challenge. Corporate governance and director obligations cover such a wide spectrum of subjects and situations, it is well neigh impossible to compress everything in a single programme of manageable duration. The IIMB programme runs over three and half days, which has been found to be the optimum for Indian circumstances and perceptions. The Global Corporate Governance Forum (sponsored by the World Bank and the OECD) runs a six-day event (designed and directed by Prof Florencio Lopez deSilanes of Yale and Mr Ira Millstein, the well known corporate governance Guru and Senior Partner of the leading US law firm of Weil, Ghotshal and Lmanges, LLP) tailor-made to regional requirements. The Institute of Directors in the UK and many other such Institutions elsewhere in the world offer director training programmes of durations varying from one-day events on specific topics or developments to several weeks, whole time or part time, and so on. Each programme eventually has to strike a balance between content delivery and time affordable by prospective participants.

Teaching pedagogy and academic rigour are important elements in delivering programmes at these levels. A reasonable collection of reference material and mandatory readings would be a must for participants. Case discussions especially having a bearing upon familiar domestic or international settings seem to go down quite well with participants. Contrary to popular belief that such director-level participants are prone to be less inclined towards case readings and analyses, preparatory to class room discussion, the IIMB experience has been pleasantly different. Once the ground rules for programme participation are established and explained, participants were found to be quite diligent and hardworking in terms of pre-class preparations. As a recall measure, however, it may be useful for the programme director or case-discussion leader to briefly recount the key elements of the case (especially if it runs into several pages, annexures and so on) so that the focus of the intra-participant interactions and discussions is maintained. An effective mechanism in practice is to inquire which of the participants had gone through the case in detail and was ready to summarize and make an opening statement as a kick-off; this usually sets the ball rolling and draws people into discussion including those who are diffident starters. Another useful practice that not only encourages participation but also keeps the interest going in the class is frequent reality-checks, asking participants to share their experience or how they would approach the issues raised in the case.

While many of these programmes are geared to non-executive and independent directors on the boards, experience has shown that the presence of at least some executive and whole time directors can significantly value-add to the benefits of the course. Besides, it is also important for the whole time directors to understand and appreciate the dynamics of board processes and differing perspectives so that their own skills in real-life board room management get enhanced. In addition, of course, they bring valuable insights from an executive directors’ perspective that will be a great value-add in an academic ambience as opposed to similar situations in practice, where more often than not, the executive and non-executive groups may see themselves protecting their respective turf and defending their positions!

III. Structuring the Programme

As indicated in the preceding section, the programme content is driven by the twin factors of what needs to be delivered and what time duration is available, taking into account various contemporary developments in the field and also based on the feedback from a representative potential participation groups. To repeat a cliché, the programme duration should not be too long to be boring and dragging for the participants, and yet not too short leading to inadequate handling of the content-delivery. At the Indian Institute of Management Bangalore, the golden mean has been found to be three and half days as noted earlier.

Content Structuring

Usually, there are two elements to content structuring: the first deals with identification of the topics that must be covered and the second, determination of the teaching methodology and the choice of the appropriate faculty.

The Programme Director, usually the champion for the initiative, would be the preferred person to draw up a desired content outline, identifying key elements of inputs that are necessary and desirable. It helps at this stage not to drop any of the topics that come up for consideration; this could be done later on after prioritizing the topics on the two qualifying criteria of importance and relevance. There are topics that are a “must” for a proper understanding and appreciation of the dimensional aspects of the subject. With regard to corporate governance, topics such as the evolution of the corporate form of organization, the distancing between ownership and control in modern business corporations, and the accountability aspects of boards and directors to shareholders and other stakeholders would form the corner stone of foundational understanding and as such they will rank very highly on both criteria. Discussions on mergers and acquisitions and the boards’ role in such transactions would of course rank high on importance but in a country where such activities are frowned upon or not permitted, their relevance in the programme would be suspect. In a country like India where the public sector and privatization debates are headline topics, they would of course rank very high on contemporary relevance criteria, but not in another country where the public sector is not as overwhelming or privatization as controversial.

The relative ranking exercise would be helpful in deriving a course design and coverage that are consistent with the time slots available. If the latter are not sufficient to cater to all the items ranked very high on the rating scale, an appropriate extension of the programme duration will be called for, either by adding days or by extending sessions. At the Centre for Corporate Governance and Citizenship in the Indian Institute of Management Bangalore, it was possible to accommodate the desired topics by extending the day and having pre-dinner sessions on all days. Positioning sessions topics in sync with their timings is an art. Thus, reasonably heavy sessions are best positioned in the forenoon when participants are fresh, case discussions are ideal for post-lunch sessions (especially if lunch proves heavy!) because they involve participation, and comparatively relaxed general input topics are good for pre-dinner sessions. The same kind of logic also applies to selection of speakers, witty and eloquent to drive away participant fatigue, serious and sober when participants are fresh.

Sequencing and flow of session topics are important considerations in programme structuring. The Programme Director is the ideal person to do this effectively since he or she has conceived the programme content and would know which of the topics should precede or succeed a session. Usually, introductory sessions are good openings to set the theoretical and contextual framework, while disparate elements and situational inputs are probably the best to follow. A concluding session may be used to pull together all the strands and reemphasize the fundamentals in a wrap-up or reflections slot.

While most Programme Directors would be familiar with these ground rules of sessions sequencing, the biggest threat to its smooth implementation invariably arises due to unsuitability of certain time slots in case of important faculty. In an effort not to miss out on a good or star speaker, sequencing is tinkered around. Care should be exercised in such efforts to ensure no major repositioning of sessions is made that would seriously impede the logical flow and build-up of the programme. Not always easy to achieve, but any major failure to maintain a balance may well lead to the programme performance itself falling below expectations.
In selecting speakers and discussion leaders, care must be exercised to choose the right persons for the topics, some one who has had practical experience in handling such situations or been a party to similar events. When discussing a de-listing case and the directors’ role and responsibility, it would not do to have a speaker who has never had to handle such situations, if the person if from business or industry or from professional practice. Similar rules may not strictly apply to academics if they were to bring in theoretical perspectives or they set the basis for a case discussion when a co-presenter with exposure could join in or take over.
An extremely useful design tool at the stage of conceptualizing and determining the course structure is to invite constructive critiquing from a “test” group or representative participants and/or from institutions that have successfully handled such programmes. The Global Corporate Governance Forum’s approach in this regard is worthy of recounting. The Forum was to hold a train-the-trainers programme in corporate governance for participants from South Asia in July 2004.. In March 2004, the Forum convened a meeting in New York to discuss the course design and structure specific to the South Asia Programme: invited to this meeting were representatives from the Philippines and Brazil, for whom the Forum had earlier conducted similar programmes in 2002 and 2003; the National Coordinator for the South Asia Programme, from the Indian institute of Management Bangalore who had pioneered these training programmes in the country; several advisers and consultants to the Forum from different countries; and the main Programme Directors, Prof De-Silanes and Mr Millstein, together with the Forum’s secretariat leaders. The IIMB Programme was commended and used as a basic input for the regional programme requirements. Different sessions as proposed and delivered earlier were reviewed and debated, and a final set was hammered out, retaining the most important and the most relevant to the regional requirements. To complement the US Directors, the Indian Coordinator was invited to join in as part of the directing group. Speakers and discussion leaders were suggested, discussed and decided on grounds of suitability and experience. Thereafter the course material work was to be pursued. This is a classic method in an international context for designing and structuring a course that would at once be relevant and important for its participants.

Sticking to the Script: The Tight Rope

Once the programme content and structure and the speaker-leader lists re finalized, the next important element in course delivery is to ensure that the sessions go through as intended, and the speakers and discussion leaders play their appointed roles! This is often easier said than achieved, especially in case of guest faculty. It is not their fault, either, since most Programme Directors content themselves by inviting the guest speakers and providing their session titles. The guests, often busy executives, do justice to their topic without any specific reference to where and how their session fits into the overall design of the programme itself. Catchy session titles are also often guilty of encouraging overlapping discourses.

At the Centre for Corporate Governance and Citizenship at the Indian Institute of Management Bangalore, the perils of leaving this to chance were realized long ago! To minimize repetition and overlap, as well as to preempt some topics falling between the stools and being left uncovered in any session, a Programme Content paper is prepared well in advance, and is sent to speakers at each of the sessions. The note outlines the objectives of the programme, its participant profile, and contains a summary of what is expected to be covered in each of the sessions, in the entire programme.

The advantage of such pre-programme intimation is that it seeks to bring the speaker up to speed not only as to what is required to be covered in his or her session, but also what is being covered in other sessions, thus setting the speaker’s session in context. Many guest speakers have commended this approach and indicated how it had helped them to structure their presentations, in the full knowledge of what is planned to be covered in the other sessions. Has this completely eliminated duplication or overlap? The answer, regrettably, is not entirely, but the good news is that most of it is avoided and the participants are the eventual beneficiaries of more complete coverage as intended.

Participants Feedback

The proof of the pudding, as the saying goes, is in the eating. In the final analysis, the success of the programme has to be measured on the satisfaction ratings that participants provide. For the Directors Programmes, the IIMB Centre obtains two sets of feedback: one is received at the end of the Programme in a Reflections Session orally, as well as in writing (anonymously if desired). The second feedback, which has only been just initiated is a system of seeking views a year or more after the Programme, to assess the extent of internalization of programme benefits and practical usefulness of the programme sessions and topics. The immediate feedback and reflections sessions have been more than satisfying and have helped in continuously upgrading and enriching the offerings. The preliminary responses that have just started coming in indicate a high level of internalization and practical utility of the programme contents. This is a trainer’s delight, to know that the programme objectives were more than met not only momentarily but on a sustainable basis after several months.

IV. An Institutional Framework of Director Orientation & Preparation

Director Training and Preparation initiatives are relatively of very recent origin in the country. The first specific Director Orientation Programme conducted by the Indian Institute of Management Bangalore, generally recognized as the pioneering effort in this field in India, was held in 2001, and have been held annually since then. At a general preparation level, the MBA Programmes at IIMB have had a Corporate Governance Elective Course for the last several years, and prior to that a Programme with similar objectives but slightly different focus on Enhancing Corporate Performance in terms of Shareholder Wealth maximization had been offered as an Elective since 1994. More recently, the Institute also offers a Core Programme in Ethics of Public Decision Making, and an Elective Programme on Public Policy Perspectives in Corporate Governance for mid-career civil servants in the MBA level Programme on Public Policy and Management. Several other organizations and Institutions have since commenced training programmes in corporate governance, not all of them directed to or focused upon directors.

The earliest recommendation relating to director training was made in 2000 by a Union Government Department (now Ministry) of Company Affairs appointed Committee on Corporate Excellence through Governance. The Report mentioned:

“On the one hand, companies will be looking for competent and independent persons of professional excellence and personal integrity to populate their boards. On the other hand, the trend towards fewer directorships and committee memberships would gain further momentum to enable independent directors to focus on the affairs of their reduced number of companies to be able to deliver. The demand-supply gap in the field of trained independent professionals available for board positions in listed corporations is thus likely to be of a significant magnitude in the near future. The transformation processes towards greater professionalisation taking place in family controlled business is also likely to compound this problem even further.

“It does seem that there is a pressing need for an institutionalized framework creating a nucleus organisation where full time and non-executive directors including those aspiring, or being groomed for such positions of responsibility may have a window on what is happening around the world, and to prepare them to shoulder the increasingly onerous responsibilities. Similar organisations such as the Institute of Directors in the UK and the National Association of Corporate Directors in the US, exist elsewhere for providing training and professional and research support to corporate directors.“

The Report went on to suggest the establishment of a Centre for Corporate Excellence to further these objectives. In pursuance of this recommendation, the Ministry of Company Affairs have now constituted a National Foundation for Corporate Governance as a separate Trust with collaboration from the Industry Chambers and Professional Bodies. The Foundation has accredited as National Centres for this purpose, the Centres for Corporate Governance at the Indian Institutes of Management Ahmedabad, Bangaloe, Kolkatta, Lucknow, and the Administrative Staff College of India and the Indian School of Business, both at Hyderabad.

With these Centres accredited, it is likely that the Director Training initiatives will get a boost and academically rigorous and practically useful programmes would be offered. Several other professional and capital market bodies have also started offering programmes in corporate governance, and to the extent this helps in further recognition of the importance of the subject and leads on to capacity building, such efforts are to be welcomed. Eventually the markets will have to decide which of the programmes on offer the best value for their time and investment.

Institutionalizing Directors Training, Orientation & Guidance Initiatives

There is also perhaps a need for an alliance among the leading Institutions to provide ongoing guidance and knowledge dissemination. The Institute of directors in the UK has been a pioneer in this field. Several institutions have come up in different countries around the world, some with and many without any linkages to the Institute of Directors in the UK. The National Association of Corporate directors in the US is more oriented towards research and publications of value to company directors. An appropriate model for institutionalizing such efforts in India would be welcome and must be pursued. Till then, the mantle of academically rigorous director training and orientation would appear to rest with the nationally accredited Centres referred to earlier.

An important dimension in such training initiative is the concept of partnering between and among organizations with complementary skills and organizational frames. Such partnering will also minimize scarce teaching and research resources being wasted in competing programmes. Since director training is not mandatory in India (and it should preferably remain so for good reasons), the market for such training has to be built up through the quality of the offerings and the value perceived by the participants. Replicating such initiatives without suitable market development is more than likely to be a futile and fruitless effort. Institutions should also seek to focus on areas of their professional or academic competencies rather than simply acting as event managers trying to bring participants and borrowed faculty together. Elsewhere in the developed world, numerous such efforts have fallen by the way side and there are lessons to learn in such experiences. Collaborative efforts should therefore be the preferred route between and among complementary institutions.

Towards a Certification Programme?

This paper has almost exclusively dealt with training, guidance and orientation of incumbent company directors. There is a further dimension that perhaps also needs addressing. India needs independent non-executive directors by the thousands to populate corporate boards. This situation will be further exacerbated when either due to mandate or of own volition, incumbent directors seek to reduce their number of directorships in companies. Being a director is a demanding task and not many can handle several such positions (often in addition to their own substantive full time avocations) on a part time basis, especially with increasing shareholder and stakeholder activism.

Under these circumstances, one should indeed ask the question whether there is not an emerging need for a certification programme that trains and equips people to take on directorships in companies on a professional basis. The programme could be of six to twelve months duration, perhaps part time, and endeavour to provide a thorough grounding leading to a Certificate in Corporate governance or Corporate Directorship. The thought is very preliminary and certainly can do with much further refining and debate. What it would provide of course is a growing number of professionally and otherwise qualified people being equipped to take on directorships with a mature understanding of what is involved in such assignments.

 


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© 2001 Academy of Corporate Governance