Hony. Editor
Dr. Bindi Mehta
(Director, Research at ICSI - CCRT, Formerly, Chief economist, CRISIL )







March, 2003

Independent Directors are acknowledgedly the Fulcrum of Corporate Governance – their role is being extolled by all and their numbers are obviously swelling. Yet there are three potential areas of research and validation to ensure that the expectations from the Independent directors are not misplaced. Firstly, Independence has been diversely defined and interpreted – we have a range of SEBI to CalPers. Hopefully the forthcoming revision of the OECD principles will make progress towards a consensus of “who” they are. (The related issue of how to get them will be resolved smoothly going by Aristotle’s statement that you can shoot well if you knew the target!) Second, would be the area of knowing “what” the best of class Independent Directors actually do in Board Rooms – we need to know the questions they ask, the conflicts they resolve, the dynamics they handle. Thirdly, “how” they do what they do – which should reckon the competencies they use to perform best.

Readers are requested to send in articles and views on Independence and Independent Directors from the above perspectives.

Editor
 
     
   
 

ACTION PLAN TO REBUILD THE NBFI SECTOR

The Core Group’s Recommendations

 

The Academy of Corporate Governance had taken the initiative of forming a Core Group for this sector with the agenda of promoting corporate governance and reviving this critical segment of the finance system. The Core Group debated the measures required which include among others, setting up of a Self Regulatory Organization, policy and regulatory reform, and training. The group has generated ideas, which have been compiled into a Compendium and sent to the policy makers and regulators by the Academy of Corporate Governance on behalf of the group.

 

Introduction

Reserve Bank of India’s regulatory surgery in 1998 removed the cancerous elements in the Non Banking Financial Institutions (NBFI) industry leaving behind a healthy nucleus of responsible corporate citizens.  Given the NBFI sector’s contribution to the economy, there is a need to rebuild the sector especially at this time when the sector is people by more responsible players.  

1.  Term Money to NBFCs

The first important foundational step that we need to take is to ensure availability of term money to leasing companies and other non-banks so that they are not compelled to write 3 to 5 year leases with 90-day money.  Presently, a major source of long term money, the capital market, is comatose.  The Financial Institutions who provide long-term money are now inactive.  Public depositors are disinclined to place funds with Non Banks.  This leaves the Non Bank sector with restricted access to bank funds alone.  The banks have at the best of times not been eager to finance Non Banks who they regrettably look upon as competition.  Several banks limit funding to 90 day or 6 monthly note loans, which make it impossible for a leasing company to write a one-year let alone a five-year lease.         

RBI could most probably help in overcoming this problem of, mismatch in maturities if they were to permit banks to roll over their loans to leasing companies and other non banks rather than insist upon their repayment within 90 or 180 days preferably to give term loans for at minimum 5 years.  The banks could in the case of other sectors continue to provide working capital financial of a year’s duration.
   
The present liquidity (in the system) is deceptive.  The liquidity is more a function of decline in industrial credit requirements  (which in turn is a function of demand / supply mismatch).  A sudden increase in aggregate demand could trigger an industrial recovery with the attendant higher Industrial Credit off-take wiping out the liquidity.  Most importantly, key infrastructure sectors like power, telecom and roadways, etc. require billions of rupees.  Right now, infrastructure is not happening and so there is no pressure on liquidity.  The moment the infrastructure revolution is ignited, there will be a tremendous pressure on liquidity.  Most importantly, govt. promises to be a perennial borrower with borrowings approximating to Rs.1,40,000 crores every year.  So Govt. may crowd out the private sector.  Therefore, NBFIs should focus on long term money/specialised funding arrangements, right now, rather than regret later.  

2.
  A Refinance Body

We experience a pressing need for an organization that will provide refinance for credit worthy transactions completed by Non Banks with tenors of 3-5 years.  The refinance body that is formed could be funded by subscription to its debenture paper or capital, by banks with surplus money.  This money could be then put to use to finance Non banks.  An alternative proposal is for major co-operative banks to be permitted to provide such refinance facilities to leasing/Non Banks etc and in the process develop strong realizable credit worthy loan assets which is what the large Co-operative Banks are looking for.
 

We also recommend that the “Refinance Body” have some regulatory role to play.  It will ensure that only those NBFIs, which have an excellent compliance track record, will be eligible for refinancing.  Resultantly, the Refinance Agency itself will act as a mini regulator and ensure compliance.  Of course RBI will continue to be the super-regulator of the whole financial system, including NBFIs.  If the refinance agency can play a secondary role, RBI’s “regulatory energy” can be more productively focused on those NBFIs, which are in the “High Risk” zone.
 

3.  Standby facilities and assistance from LIC which is an entity with long term money
        

We suggest that Reserve Bank of India permit us to obtain a stand by facilities from commercial banks so that against bank’s standby facilities we can approach the Commercial Paper market as also Mutual funds to raise funds.  Most importantly LIC could ear mark may be 0.5% of its resources to provide refinance / direct finance to Non Banks for periods of 5-7 years.  LIC gets life insurance money, which is long term and so, could extend term credit.


4.  A “Level playing field” with Banks.
        

Most importantly if non-banks are to make a meaningful contribution to growth, it follows that since they are as closely regulated as the banks via prudential norms relating to Capital Adequacy, Provisioning for NPAs, Concentration Norms and “Mark-to-Market” applications, that it is understandable we seek a level playing field with the banks and request the following benefits which presently are exclusively reserved for banks:

Deposit Insurance
Liquidity Support
Lender of the last resort facility
Entry into the call market
Authorization to raise offshore funds, etc.

5.  A level playing field for domestic and multinational non banks         

Another important issue that needs be addressed is the absence of a level playing field between Indian and Multinational Non Banks such as GE Capital and General Motor Finance.  These companies are permitted to issue a paper called a “Keep Well”, agreement signed by their parent GE Capital or General Motors, USA which is given a Triple ‘A’ by international rating agencies.  Resultantly banks are readily prepared to provide them funding, despite the fact that this the ‘Keep Well’ agreement may not withstand closer scrutiny in a court of law; as it is merely a piece of paper.
        

More importantly they have an unfair advantage over us because we have to justify credit on the basis of our operation in India alone whereas multinationals are prepared to ear mark their lines of credit for GE Capital and GMAC, USA to the benefit of their Indian operations.  We cannot possibly get the same benefit.  What follows is that the multinational banks then takes a position that their credit limits for the Non bank sector are saturated so the Indian Non Banks are not in a position to get funding.  The foregoing does not amount to a level playing field and NBFCs in India are placed at a disadvantage in our own country.

6. An evaluation model that goes beyond the simple quantification of a Capital Adequacy Ratio

If we are to rebuild the Non Banking sector on firmer foundations it is important that there be a system based on a capability / maturity model by which non-bank leasing companies be evaluated and screened before they are allowed to engage in leasing activities.  We strongly recommend that the criteria to be adopted not be limited to a quantitative factor such as a paid capital of Rs.2-3 crores.  What matters most is the experience, track record and financial maturity of the management to run a financial services company.


We present a proposed model:


Capability Maturity Model

 
Weight
3
2
1
Net Owned Funds
0.10
More than 50 crs. 25 – 50 crs Less than 25 crs
Existence (no. of years)
0.10
More than 25yrs More than 15 yrs Less than 15 yrs
CEO Score

1. Industry experience


1. International experience


2. Industry leadership qualities


0.05


0.05



0.05


More than 25 years


More than 3 international cities


Association leadership


And


Involvement in tax/other issues relating to the industry


More than 15 years


More than 2 international cities.


Either Association leadership


Or


Involvement in tax/other issues relating to the industry


Others


Others



Others
Credit rating 0.10 AA- and above A+ A-
Diversified portfolio 0.10 More than 15 Inds. 10 Inds. Less than 10 Inds.
Gross NPA ratio 0.05 Less than 5% Less than 7.5% Others
Predominantly leasing / hirepurchase company 0.10 75% of the asset base comprising lease & hirepurchase assets 60% of the asset base comprising lease & hirepurchase assets Less than 60%
Diversified sources (Dependence on deposits) 0.10 Deposits to Total liabilities less than 25% 25% to 33.33% Others
Regularity of filing RBI Returns 0.10 Regular Good Others
Litigation (excluding tax disputes & normal recovery suits) 0.05 Less than 10 crs Value of 10 – 15 crs. Others
Advertisement strategies 0.05 Fair Reasonable Others
  1.00  

Explanatory note on Capability Maturity Model (CMM)

The proposed model is designed to serve the following objectives:


i.The proposed CMM will help the regulator carve out a separate class of NBFCs, whose “management capability” will unquestionably be superior to the rest.  The model will help RBI to distinguish the well managed NBFCs from the rest.  In short, NBFCs who score high on the proposed CMM will pose a lesser “regulatory risk”.  It follows that supervisory concerns relating to their operations will be minimal.  This may help the regulator to focus “regulatory energy” on NBFCs, who fall in the “High risk zone” (Those who score low on the CMM).

ii.  Entry barrier


CMM will also serve as an effective entry barrier so that any one, who does not possess the required “intellectual capital” in terms of “skill sets” that are required to manage NBFCs will be shut out.  It will not stop at measuring capability to inject the “financial capital”.  But it will also focus on the “quality of management” and their ability to act as a custodian of the savings of thousands of retail investors.


iii. The capability maturity model will help the regulator to link the dispensations / concessions that are to be given to various NBFCs to the actual scoring.  This will help the regulator extend dispensation only to those deserving NBFCs in a fully transparent manner, so that others, who are not merit worthy cannot clamour for the same set of dispensations irrespective of their size, strength and capability.

Other issues


The model may appear to be biased in favour of existing NBFCs with a track record of more than a decade.  A question may arise as to how effective the model will be as an entry barrier.  Any new entrant may loose out on parameters, such as existence, quality of portfolio, etc.  As the model will be in the “Public Domain”, it is open to aspiring new entrants to attempt to improve their score by working on other balancing parameters, such as NOFs, credit rating and the CEO score.  To illustrate, new entrants may be forced to bring in close to Rs.50 crores, if they are to offset the low score on other parameters.  If any large industrial houses or an MNC operation with a strong track record elsewhere, propose to operationalise a new NBFC, they need arrange for a parent guarantee / comfort to the rating agency and obtain a better credit rating on day one, say AA- and above.  This way, we mitigate the perils of the “halo effect”. Anyone who claims “strong parentage” or “international presence” is forced to deliver on day one ie. at the stage of commencement of business.  Some start ups may be forced to hire a “high calibre” CEO with relevant international experience to improve the score.

7. Statement of Chairman of ALFS on Kelkar Committee report on December 4, 2002
 

ALFS has expressed concern over the Kelkar committee’s proposal to align the depreciation on a company’s books with the depreciation adopted for its Income Tax (IT) returns.         

The industry body contends that the move would depress corporate profits, therefore making capital market less attractive for investments.  There is a need to re-ignite the capital market as the leasing industry needs long-term funds to finance lease assistance.  Mr. Farook Irani, Chairman of ALFS, said.

At the same time, ALFS has welcomed several recommendations of the committee like the removal of long term capital gains tax, the non-taxation of dividends in the hands of the shareholders, removal of dividend tax, scrapping of minimum alternate tax and reducing corporate taxes.

The arrangement of charging higher depreciation rates in the tax return and lower depreciation on the books has proved itself over the years, as India compared with most other countries in Asia, including China, has had a more vibrant capital market.  This has helped in India’s impressive capital asset formation.

Apart from increasing tax outflow for India Inc., the proposal may also negatively impact capital asset formation and GDP growth as explained in the following lines:

a.  Capital asset formation


We cannot strongly enough emphasise that this is not merely a problem of the Leasing Industry, but affects the entire Capital Goods Industry and resultantly is more than likely to negatively impact GDP growth rate, leading to lower capital asset formation.  Parliament in its wisdom allows corporates to accelerate depreciation in the tax return (IT Act) and to adopt lower depreciation rates in the Books (Companies Act) to achieve the twin objectives of encouraging capital asset formation on the one hand and boosting the capital market on the other. 


b.  GDP growth


Most importantly, if we analyse the GDP growth pattern, Agriculture presently registers a “nil” growth rate, Services are booming, but regrettably it’s the negative growth in the “capital goods industry”, which pulls down the GDP growth rate.  The bulk of capital asset acquisition over the last 3 years was in the area of IT Products or automobiles.  Industrial assets ie. plant & machineries are not in the “hot favourite” list (weightless world syndrome).  But India still needs physical infrastructure and capital asset formation

c.  Loss of a key economic Administration tool.


The tax depreciation rate is an important tool in the hands of policy makers to direct / channelise capital flow into specific sectors / economic activity to fulfil a particular national priority.  To illustrate, when the govt. wanted to encourage non-conventional energy, the easiest way was to increase the depreciation rate to 100%.  No one can deny that, but for this important “fiscal stimuli” India would not have benefited by a huge capacity expansion in a non-polluting, inexhaustible source of wind energy.  By aligning the book depreciation and the tax depreciation, the govt. denies itself this motivational trigger especially at this time when after repeated interest rate reduction, any further drop in interest rates is unlikely to encourage economic growth.

d. Deferred Tax


One may argue that alignment is anyway achieved by the “Deferred tax” provision.  This present provision is harder hitting than deferred tax.  Whilst deferred tax is an accounting provision and thus “cash neutral”, the tax bite in this provision is real and undeniable.  So, the proposed recommendation would result in higher tax outflows for corporates possibly impacting the repayment capacity of the corporate sector, which could trigger a “Rating Migration” and negatively impact the capital market.

There is an urgent need to have a complete re-look at the various issues affecting NBFIs, be it taxation or  regulatory and administrative issues, so as to provide the sector with a level playing field with banks and Financial Institutions with whom NBFIs have to compete in line with the global trends of Universal Banking and Financial Supermarkets.  We have listed some important issues, resolution of which is very important for the industry to survive and contribute effectively towards economic development of the country so as to address the issues effectively, in an organized manner and to find solutions, we request the formation of a special committee of 10 members with equal representation from Ministry of Finance, CBDT, RBI, Empowered Committee of States Finance Ministers to Sales Tax and introduction of VAT and the NBFI industry.  The committee besides going into details of the various issues can also provide a long-term strategy and vision statement for this sector, in the larger interest of depositors, shareholders and employees.

8. Extension of Income Tax Benefits Under Sec.10 (23G) & 36(1)(viii) for Leasing or Hire Purchase Finance as well as Loans Granted in Infrastructure Activities

The existing provisions of Sec.10 (23) and 36(1) of Indian Income Tax Act, 1961 do not extend the Income Tax benefits to a lease or hire purchase transaction.  As of now, an infrastructure Capital Company (ICC) or Infrastructure Capital Fund (ICF) as defined under Section 10(23G) is entitled to tax exemption in respect of all its earnings arising out of its investments (equity or debt) made in infrastructure projects listed under Section 90-1A.  Similarly, under Section 36(1)(viii) notified Companies, who are engaged in providing long term finance for construction or for purchase of houses for residential use can claim deduction upto 40% of their profits for creating a special reserve.  However, an NBFI is not entitled for the same tax breaks in so far as its investments in the specified infrastructure projects through lease or hire purchase of loan transactions are concerned.  It is imperative to extend these benefits to NBFIs also as long as the objective of channeling investments in certain designated infrastructure projects are met.

We would, therefore, strongly recommend that the benefits provided under Section 10(23)(g) and Section 36(1)(viii) of Indian income Tax Act, 1961 be extended to lease and hire purchase transactions and loan transactions also.


9
Mandatory Provisions by leasing companies to be allowed as deductible expenses         

NBFIs are now subject to directions of RBI as regards income recognition and provisioning norms.
        

Under the existing provisions under section 36(1)(viia) in the Income Tax Act, a provision for bad and doubtful debts made by banks and financial institutions is allowed as a deduction to the extent of 5% from the gross total income.  The last budget has increased this limit to 7.5%.  Alternatively, such banks and financial institutions have been given an option to claim a deduction in respect of any provision made for assets classified by the RBI as doubtful assets or loss assets to the extent of 10% (increased from 5%) of such assets.  There are no such provisions for NBFIs they are required to write off bad debts and satisfy other conditions to claim deduction just like any other business.

The stand of NBFIs have also been endorsed in a recent ruling of the ITAT Bench of Madras in the case of Overseas Sanmar Financial Ltd.  The Bench held that provisioning against bad and doubtful debts by an NBFI as per the norms of the RBI is deductible against the income of the company.  If RBI issues mandatory circulars or accounting standards the CBDT must give effect to it for tax purpose as well.

RBI’s directive to account for income on cash basis is an appreciation of the fact that it does not make sense to account the income on accrual basis giving no credence to the actual recovery and later allowing deduction for irrecoverable debts including debts that could not be recovered in full from the security provided because of erosion in the value of the security.
        

Therefore, along with banks and FIs NBFIs should also be appropriately covered under Section 36(1)(viia) of the Income Tax Act.


10
Hike in depreciation rates on construction equipment, similar to vehicles used for hiring out

The Income Tax Act allows depreciation at the rate of 100% in case of certain equipment’s meant for pollution control, solid waste control, mineral oil concerns, mines and quarries, energy saving devices and renewable energy devices etc, the Act also allows higher rate of depreciation (50%) to motor cars, buses, motor lorries and taxis used in a business of running them on hire.  The idea behind such higher allowance of depreciation, apart from providing for the wear and tear of the equipment is also the requirement and acute need of such investments because of their positive effect on the economy of the country.  Similarly construction equipments should also enjoy higher rate of depreciation to compensate for the higher wear and tear and also to encourage development of infrastructure since they are primarily used in the infrastructure sector.

10.  Long term foreign currency swaps for asset financing companies (AFC)
        

As mentioned earlier, some of the NBFIs are engaged in the business of financing of infrastructure equipment and small to medium sized infrastructure projects.  It is understood that long-term funds are needed for infrastructure development.  These NBFIs are, therefore, extending credit to the infrastructure projects out of the line of credit to be availed from IFC, Washington or any other bilateral or multilateral financial institutions or a foreign bank.  If they assume the entire forex (FX) liability and extended credit in rupee terms, they would need to hedge their risks, which are many a time compulsorily stipulated by the foreign lending institutions.  Such a hedging involves Foreign Currency-Rupee swap and it required MOF’s specific permission.
 
A general permission for the said swap transactions should, therefore, be provided for, as it would help channelise long-term foreign funds for infrastructure development in the country and simultaneously mitigate the forex risk of the domestic financial companies.


11.   Coverage of NBFCs engaged in Lease & Hire Purchase in the new NPA
Act         

On June 21, 2002, the Government has promulgated the new NPA Ordinance, which deals with three distinct actions in respect of financial assets with regard to banks and financial institutions in the form of securitisation of assets, setting up of asset reconstruction companies and enforcement of security interest.  However, although the coverage of banks in this Ordinance has been adequate, the issue of recovery of outstandings plaguing NBFIs have not been suitably addressed.

Section 2(m) of the Ordinance defines a Financial Institutions and includes any Non-Banking Financial company as defined in clause F of Section 45-1 of the RBI’s Act, 1934 which the Central Government may by notification specify as financial institution for the purposes of this Ordinance. All NBFIs involved in lease and hire purchase of assets should be notified in terms of Clause 2(m) of the Ordinance.

Furthermore, all the NBFIs involved in leasing and hire purchase of assets should be notified under the Section as a category, irrespective of the fact whether they are advancing loans against the security of an asset or financing the asset by way of Lease or Hire Purchase since the nature remains same in both the forms, which is essentially financing the assets.  But due to the form of lease or hire purchase whereby the Lessor (financier) is considered to be the owner (in form, not in substance), no security interest can be created. However, the exclusions defined in Chapter VI, Section 31(3) of the Ordinance say that any conditional sale, hire purchase or lease or any other contract in which no security interest has been created will not be covered in this Ordinance.  This is a severe blow for category of NBFIs stated above, since they will not have any right in this Ordinance.  We do not find any rationale for excluding such a vital and important financial transaction, out of the purview of this Ordinance.

12.   Nominee directors appointed by NBFIs – Level playing field with FIs
        

Nominee Directors appointed by financial institution or banks on the Boards of the companies assisted by them are accorded certain special privileges by virtue of overriding provisions contained in the enactments.

To safeguard their interests NBFIs also have to appoint nominees on the Boards of their borrowers, but the above mentioned privileges are not accorded to the Directors so nominated by them.  The need to protect the interest of the lender is same for FIs, Banks or for that matter, NBFIs.  Hence this is again area where level playing field must be provided to NBFIs.

13.   Considering hypothecation of infrastructure assets as part of EL/HP Assets for classification of an NBFI as Equipment Leasing or Hire Purchase finance Company

RBI in it’s Circular No.DNBS (PD) CC No.18/02.01/2001-02 dated January 1, 2002 decided to include loans against hypothecation of all types of automobiles like trucks, buses, tractors, cars, three wheelers, two wheelers and dumpers, which are registered with Road Transport Authority and the charge is recognized by Motor Vehicles Act; aircraft registered with Director General of Civil Aviation and ships registered with Director General of Shipping, along with other equipment leasing and hire purchase assets for the purpose of classification of NBFI as equipment leasing or hire purchase finance company.  But very importantly the circular ignored a large and important segment, which is loans against construction equipment and other equipment used for infrastructure development and also loans granted for infrastructure projects.  We feel there is no justification at all for their non-inclusion.

For the purpose of classification of an NBFI as equipment leasing or hire purchase finance company.


a.            Loans against hypothecation of all types of construction equipment and infrastructure related equipment.
b.            Loans granted for infrastructure projects, which have the security of infrastructure asset, itself.


14.   Exemption to Asset Financing Companies u/s 194A(3)(iii) of the IT Act
        

As per Section 194A of the Income Tax Act 1961, tax has to be deducted out of the interest payment made by any borrower to the lender at the rates in force.  The rates vary depending on the construction of the payee (lender).  For category of domestic companies in which NBFIs fall it is presently 20.4% (inclusive of surcharge of 2%). Banking companies, Co-operative Societies engaged in banking business, public financial institutions, LIC, UTI, Insurance Companies and some other notified institutions are exempted from the purview of this section implying that if the payment of interest is made to them, the borrower is not required to deduct TDS out of the interest payment.

This stipulation puts NBFIs in a disadvantageous position and creates severe cash flow constraints since NBFIs operate on a very thin spread of interest income.  If we analyze a typical loan transaction of NBFI, we may find lending say at 16% and borrowing say at 13%, giving a gross margin of 3%.  The interest income of the NBFI will be subject to TDS of 20.4%, implying 3.26% out of 16% will go for TDS deduction, which is more than the total margin available.  Therefore, there is no justification in imposing TDS stipulations on the interest repayment made to NBFIs.
Such a stipulation forces NBFIs to avoid granting loans or offer high rates of interest to borrowers, which acts as a alternate system for the borrower and defeats the very purpose of NBFIs in the financial sector.         

RBI has now allowed loans against hypothecation of certain assets to be considered along with the lease/hire purchase assets to satisfy the 60 per cent norms for classification of an NBFI as equipment leasing or hire purchase finance company.  Hence, it is expected that there will be increased financing by NBFIs in the form of loans.  It is thus essential that the TDS anomaly explained above is rectified immediately in order to reduce the cost of intermediaries and ensure flow of capital to infrastructure sectors of the economy, which is the direct focus area of Asset Financing NBFIs.  This will also ensure uniformity in taxation of similar business.

Therefore, exemption should be granted from TDS on interest payment to NBFIs under Section 194A(3)(iii) of the IT Act.  To avoid misuse of the exemption, CBDT can stipulate that only NBFIs registered with RBI shall be entitled to the exemption.

15.   Withdrawal of tax deduction of interest paid on foreign borrowings
        

The Union Budget 2001-02 has withdrawn the External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) tax exemption in respect of interest paid effective from 1st of June, 2001.  This withdrawal of exemption, has raised the cost of borrowings to the extent of tax deducted as the foreign lenders are insisting upon gross interest payment, i.e., without deduction of tax.  All external commercial borrowing documentation carry a standard clause that interest shall be paid on gross basis.  According to this clause the borrower for example an Indian Company would pay the withholding tax to the government and also pay the full amount to the lender.  ECB route has been a cheap source of finance for the Indian companies, but the withdrawal of tax exemption has jeopardized the operation of all companies in the country who follow the ECB route for raising their funds.  The withdrawal of the exemption is also eroding the Indian Corporate Sector’s cost competitiveness vis-à-vis other Asian countries like Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and Taiwan, which do not impose withholding taxes.  It is, therefore, suggested to revert back to the earlier provisions and grant exemption from deduction of tax on interest paid on ECB loans.























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SARBANES - OXLEY ACT
 
 



Coming in the wake of corporate collapses and erosions in the levels of confidence in professions and reputed consultants, Sarbanes – Oxley Act, has set newer standards that are attracting worldwide attention. While the standards are being debated and emulated in several other economies for promoting corporate governance, there are issues whether the faith in self regulation is depleting and whether more active, if not intrusive, mechanisms are required for enforcing greater transparency and preventing frauds and criminality of executives and professionals. The full text of the Act is reproduced below for the benefit of our readers.

 
Executive Summary of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

On July 30, 2002 President Bush signed into law the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. The law was intended to bolster public confidence in our nation’s capital markets and imposes new duties and significant penalties for non compliance on public companies and their executives, directors, auditors, attorneys and securities analysts. The full implications of the legislation will come after further actions by the Securities and Exchange Commission and the newly created Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. Most of the provisions of this new law only apply to public companies that file a form 10-K with the Securities and Exchange Commission their auditors and securities analyists. This summary is intended to give a broad overview of the new legislation and is not intended to constitute legal advice on the implications of this legislation.

Title I: Public Company Accounting Oversight Board

  • Establishes a five member Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (with general oversight by the SEC) to:
     
    • Oversee the audit of public companies
    • Establish audit report standards and rules
    • Inspect, investigate and enforce compliance on the part of registered public accounting firms and those associated with the firms
       
  • Requires public accounting firms that participate in any audit report with respect to any issuer to register with the Board (this act also applies to foreign public accounting firms that prepare or furnish an audit report for an issuer)
     
  • Directs the Board to establish (or modify) the auditing and related attestation standards, quality control and the ethics standards used by registered public accounting firms to prepare and issue audit reports.
     
  • Requires auditing standards to include (among other things):
     
    • Seven year retention period for audit work papers
    • Second partner review and approval
    • Evaluation of whether internal control structure and procedures include records that accurately reflect transactions and disposition of assets
    • Receipts and expenditures are made only with authorization of senior management and directors
    • Description of both material weaknesses in internal controls and of material noncompliance
       
  • Mandates continuing inspections of public accounting firms for compliance
     
    • annually for firms that provide audit reports for more then 100 issuers
    • at least every three years for firms that provide audit reports for 100 or fewer issuers
       
  • Empowers the Board to impose disciplinary or remedial sanctions upon registered firms and their associates for intentional conduct or repeated instances of negligent conduct.
     
  • Directs the SEC to report to Congress on adoption of a principles-based accounting system by the U.S. financial reporting system.
     
  • Funds the Board through fees collected from issuers.

Title II: Auditor Independence

  • Prohibits an auditor from performing specified non-audit services contemporaneously with an audit. Allows the audit committee to approve some activities for non-audit services that are not expressly forbidden by the Act.
     
  • Prohibits an audit partner from being the lead or reviewing auditor for more then five consecutive years (auditor rotation).
     
  • Requires that auditors report to the audit committee:
     
    • Critical accounting policies and practices used in the audit
    • Alternative treatments and their ramifications within GAAP
    • Material written communications between the auditor and senior management of the issuer
       
  • Places a one year prohibition on auditor performing audit services if the issuer’s senior executives had been employed by that auditor and had participated in the audit of the issuer during the one year period preceding the audit initiation date.
     
  • Encourages State regulatory authorities to make independent determinations on the standards for supervising non-registered public accounting firms and consider the size and nature of their clients’ businesses audit.

Title III: Corporate Responsibility

  • Requires each member of the audit committee to be a member of the board of directors, but otherwise independent (no other compensatory fees or affiliations with the issuer). Confers upon the audit committee responsibility for appointment, compensation and oversight of any registered public accounting firm employed to perform audit services. Gives audit committee authority to hire independent counsel and other advisors and requires issuer to fund them.
     
  • Instructs the SEC to promulgate rules requiring the CEO and CFO to certify in periodic financial reports:
     
    • The report does not contain untrue statements or material omissions
    • The financial statements fairly present, in all material respects the financial conditions and results of operations
    • Such officers are responsible for internal controls designed to ensure that they receive material information regarding the issuer and consolidated subsidiaries
    • That the internal controls have been reviewed for their effectiveness within 90 days prior to the report
    • Any significant changes to the internal controls
       
  • Reincorporation or transfer of corporate domicile or offices from inside the US does not impact the reach of the rules in the filing of these reports
     
  • Deems it to be unlawful for corporate personnel to exert improper influence upon an audit for the purpose of rendering financial statements materially misleading
     
  • The CEO and CFO must forfeit certain bonuses and compensation received if the company is required to make an accounting restatement due to the material non compliance of an issuer. (bonuses and compensation one year from the original issuance or filing that needed restating )
     
  • Amends the Securities and Exchange Act of 1933 to authorize a violator of certain SEC rules from serving as an officer or director if the person’s conduct demonstrates unfitness to serve…the previous rule required “substantial unfitness”
     
  • Provides a ban on trading by directors and executive officers in a public company’s stock during pension fund blackout periods
     
  • Imposes obligations on attorneys appearing before the SEC to report violations of securities laws and breaches of fiduciary duty by a public company or its agents to the chief legal counsel or CEO of the company.
     
  • Allows civil penalties to be added to a disgorgement fund for the benefit of victims of securities violations.

Title IV: Enhanced Financial Disclosures

  • Requires financial reports filed with the SEC to reflect all material correcting adjustments that have been identified. Requires disclosure of all material off-balance sheet transactions and relationships that may have a material effect upon the financial status of an issue
     
  • Prohibits personal loans extended by a corporation to its executives and directors with some exceptions including loans made by an insured depository institution if they are subject to the insider lending restrictions of the Federal Reserve Act (Reg. O).
     
  • Requires senior management, directors, and principal stockholders to disclose changes in securities ownership or securities based swap agreements within two business days (formerly ten days after the close of the calendar month). Mandates electronic filing and availability of such disclosures one year after the date of enactment.
     
  • Annual reports are to include an internal control report which states that the management is responsible for the internal control structure and procedures for financial reporting and assesses the effectiveness of the internal controls for the previous fiscal year
     
  • Requires issuer to disclose whether it has adopted a code of ethics for its senior financial officers and whether its audit committee consists of at least one member who is a financial expert
     
  • Mandates regular, systematic SEC review of periodic disclosures by issuers, including review of an issuer’s financial statement

Title V: Analyst Conflicts of Interest

  • Restricts the ability of investment bankers to pre-approve research reports
     
  • Ensures research analysts are not supervised by persons involved in investment banking activities
     
  • Prevents retaliation against analysts by employers in return for writing negative reports
     
  • Establishes blackout periods for brokers or dealers participating in a public offering during which they may not distribute reports related to such offering
     
  • Enhances structural separation in registered brokers or dealers between analyst and investment banking activities
     
  • Requires specific conflict of interest disclosures by research analysts making public appearances and by brokers or dealers in research reports including:
     
    • Whether the analyst holds securities in the public company that is the subject of the appearance or report
       
    • Whether any compensation was received by the analyst, or broker or dealer, from the company that was the subject of the appearance or report
       
    • Whether a public company that is the subject of an appearance or report is, or during the prior one year period was, a client of the broker or dealer
       
    • Whether the analyst received compensation with respect to a research report, based upon banking revenues of the registered broker or dealer.

Title VI: Commission Resources and Authority

  • Authorizes a 77.21% increase over the appropriations for FY 2002 including money for pay parity, information and technology, security enhancements, and recovery and mitigation activities related to the September 11th terrorist attacks.
     
  • $98 million is included to hire no less then 200 additional qualified professionals to provide improved oversight of auditors and audit services.
     
  • Authorizes the SEC to censure persons appearing or practicing before the Commission if it finds, among other things, a person to have engaged in unethical or improper professional conduct
     
  • Authorizes Federal courts to prohibit persons from participating in penny stock offerings if the persons are subject proceedings instituted for alleged violations of securities laws.
     
  • Expands the scope of the SEC’s disciplinary authority by allowing it to consider orders of state securities commissions when deciding whether to limit the activities , functions, or operations of brokers or dealers

Title VII: Studies and Reports

  • Sets up various reports and studies including
     
    • Factors leading to the consolidation of public accounting firms and its impact on capital formation and securities markets
    • The role of credit rating agencies in the securities markets
    • The number of securities professionals practicing before the Commission who have aided an abetted Federal securities violations but have not been penalized as a primary violator
    • SEC enforcement actions it has taken regarding violations of reporting requirements and restatements of financial statements
    • GAO report on whether investment banks and financial advisors assisted public companies in earnings manipulation and obfuscation of financial conditions

Title VIII: Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability

  • Imposes criminal penalties for knowingly destroying, altering, concealing, or falsifying records with intent to obstruct or influence either a Federal investigation or a matter in bankruptcy and for failure of an auditor to maintain for a five year period all audit or review work papers pertaining to an issuer of securities (ten years in prison)
     
  • Makes non-dischargeable in bankruptcy certain debts incurred in violation of securities fraud laws
     
  • Extends the statute of limitations to permit a private right of action for a securities fraud violation to not later then two years after its discovery or five years after the date of the violation
     
  • Provides whistleblower protection to prohibit a publicly traded company from retaliating against an employee because of any lawful act by the employee to assist in an investigation of fraud or other conduct by Federal regulators, Congress or supervisors, or to file or participate in a proceeding relating to fraud against shareholders.
     
  • Subjects to fine or imprisonment (up to 25 years) any person who knowingly defrauds shareholders of publicly traded companies

Title IX: White Collar Crime Penalty Enhancements

  • Increases penalties for mail and wire fraud from five to twenty years in prison
     
  • Increases penalties for violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (up to $500,000 and 10 years in prison)
     
  • Establishes criminal liability for failure of corporate officers to certify financial reports, including maximum imprisonment of ten years for knowing that the periodic report does not comply with the act or for twenty years for willfully certifying a statement knowing it does not comply with this act.

Title X: Corporate Tax Returns

  • Expresses the sense of the Senate that the Federal income tax return of a corporation should be signed by its chief executive officer

Title XI: Corporate Fraud Accountability

  • Amends Federal criminal law to establish a maximum 20 year prison term for tampering with a record or otherwise impeding an official proceeding
     
  • Authorizes the SEC to seek a temporary injunction to freeze extraordinary payments earmarked for designated persons or corporate staff under investigation for possible violations of Federal securities law
     
  • Authorizes the SEC to prohibit a violator of rules governing manipulative, deceptive devices, and fraudulent interstate transactions, from serving as officer or director of a publicly traded corporation if the persons conduct demonstrates unfitness to serve
     
  • Increases penalties for violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to up to $25 million dollars and up to 20 years in prison
 















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© 2001 Academy of Corporate Governance